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1 Executive summary 
Risk identification is one of the keys to successful risk management, but we are not equally aware of all risks.  
Because the brain filters information, people make decisions based on a subset of the available evidence. 
This fundamental principle of cognition1 can cause problems in a context such as underwriting where 
subjective judgments are important.  
 
This report introduces insurers and financial decision makers to some fundamental principles of cognition 
that are important for risk management and discusses how human factors can affect risk perception. The 
report draws on various areas within psychology and related disciplines to highlight potential biases in risk 
perception. 
 
The report is a follow-up to the Lloyd’s Emerging Risks report “Behaviour: Bear, Bull or Lemming” published 
in 2010, which provides an overview of behavioural theory and discusses the benefits to insurance 
professionals of being aware of behavioural biases.  
 
Expectations can hinder or facilitate the identification of risks 
Expectations can lead people to overlook events that are not part of the normal routine. Accurate 
expectations rely on prompt and accurate feedback; if feedback is inaccurate, delayed, or diffused, then 
faulty mental models can develop. People’s expectations are strongly influenced by personal experience and 
current events: frequent exposure to risks may also make it easier to lose sight of infrequent losses. 
Unexpected losses can arise from interrelated risks, from the way the public responds to a disaster or 
hazard, and from events that are not captured in risk models.   
 
Risk perception is context dependent 
People cannot attend to all risks; they have to prioritise some over others. Risk priorities are culturally 
transmitted. Re/insurers may focus more on risks that are easier to evaluate, which can draw attention away 
from those that are more difficult to assess. This is because people prefer to focus on well-structured 
problems and veer away from more difficult ones. People are also inclined to take greater risks in 
environments that encourage ambition. The spatial concentration of expertise in the London Market has 
many benefits, but it also provides a context that can lead to biases arising from social interactions. Risks 
may be overlooked when many people rely on the perceptions and actions of a few ‘experts’ and/or align 
themselves with commonly held beliefs. 
 
Power affects risk perception 
Organisations are characterised by hierarchies, often beyond the formal roles assigned to individuals. People 
in power tend to be more confident and this can lead them to minimise risks. Power can also reduce 
willingness to adopt different viewpoints and enhance the tendency to seek information that reinforces 
already held views, which may cause problems in an underwriting context. Incentives which encourage a low 
risk appetite can counteract these behaviours and make power holders more averse to risks.  
 
risk perceptions vary over different timescales 
People often under-emphasise the history of previous similar events, which can increase forecasting error. 
Short-term incentives can reduce foresight and risks which are likely to happen in the long-term future can be 
more easily overlooked. People tend to be more optimistic about future events or activities, but as these 
events draw nearer their attention turns to potential drawbacks or losses. Sometimes events or activities that 
were once desirable are no longer appealing when viewed from a closer perspective. Finally, losses 
associated with concrete events are often more compelling than those associated with more abstract events.  
 
organisational practices can increase risk awareness 
Analyses of organisations have highlighted factors which can increase risk awareness and improve risk 
management outcomes. These include fostering mindfulness and analytic thinking among staff, embracing 
                                                     
 
 
1Cognition is the process of thinking, reasoning, and forming judgments. 
 diversity, giving people a ‘licence to think’ and the ability to make decisions. Organisational practices should 
also encourage people to use alternative ways of analysing problems. 
 
risk experts need to be aware of how uncertainty affects their decision-
making 
Signs of potential hazards are not always clear-cut and can be hard to interpret. A low risk appetite can 
increase false alarms and a high risk appetite increases misses. Neither attitude helps to identify threats 
when the evidence is uncertain. Re/insurers need to keep up with the pace of developments and scan risk 
horizons within relevant timescales. Finally, when dealing with uncertainty people tend to rationalise their 
decisions, reducing their awareness of their own bias.  
 
Human factors are an important part of managing risks 
Re/insurers can benefit from research conducted in the social sciences and humanities. There is a need for 
more front-line research and interaction between academia and the industry. There are limitations to the 
identification of risks; unknowns need to be acknowledged and managed carefully.  
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2 Introduction 
Following the 2008 financial crisis the US government created a commission to investigate its causes. 
According to the commission, households and lenders took excessive risks. Institutional regulations failed 
and ethical principles were ignored. Phil Angelides, chairman of the inquiry, concluded that: “Despite the 
view expressed by many on Wall Street and in Washington that the crisis could not have been foreseen or 
avoided, there were warning signs. The greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could 
have seen this coming and thus nothing could have been done. If we accept this notion, it will happen 
again.”i 
 
Why did institutions not respond to the looming risk of a global crisis? A few years ago, a group of 
researchers from Harvard University asked volunteers to watch a video of a small group of people 
exchanging basketball passes.ii Suddenly a person in a gorilla costume enters the scene, walks into the 
middle of the game, stops in the centre, pounds his chest, and then walks off. The players seemed 
unimpressed, continuing to throw their passes around the gorilla. The researchers later questioned the 
volunteers about the video they had watched. Many of the volunteers had no recollection whatsoever of a 
gorilla. What is more, the more closely the volunteers had focused on the game, the less likely they were to 
notice the gorilla.  
 
How can people miss a gorilla in plain sight? The answer is provided through a phenomenon called 
inattentional blindness. It is a powerful illustration of the fact that perception involves attention. Without 
attention, we can look at something yet not see it. We are, in a sense, blind without ever noticing the 
blindness. There is no black spot, nothing unusual that would attract our attention, yet we have just missed 
out on a sizable part of the world surrounding us. If you find this hard to believe think about the last time you 
noticed the office floor had been cleaned; the new flowers on the reception desk; or a new advertisement on 
the bus. It is easy to miss changes.  
 
So why was the financial crisis not foreseen or avoided?  There is no single answer to this question. 
Considering that people can be blind to a gorilla in plain sight, it is safe to assume that much less tangible 
things, such as a looming systemic risk, can be overlooked. This is even likelier in complex environments 
where attention can easily be engaged elsewhere.  
 
This report draws on fundamental principles of human perception and cognition to highlight factors that can 
hinder or help the identification of risk factors. Under what circumstances are risks likely to go unnoticed? 
What steps can be taken to increase individuals’ sensitivity to potential hazards? This report examines these 
questions with a particular focus on new or emerging risks, drawing on examples taken from underwriting. 
The report is unique in its emphasis on risk identification or awareness.2 Many of the principles outlined in 
the report have not been discussed outwith the academic community. 
 
Some may query the relevance of human factors given the prevalence of quantitative risk models in the 
re/insurance sector; the suggestion being that modelling rules out biases. However, some programmes 
require re/insurers to evaluate and quantify extreme events that occur rarely or perhaps never. This task 
cannot be done solely on the basis of modelling and fitting parameters to available data. When extreme 
events are modelled there are no prescribed ways to compute probabilities from different sources of 
information, nor for combining this information once probabilities have been established. iii With limited data, 
any source of information that is overlooked can lead to misinterpretations. This implies that human factors 
play an important role within the actual modelling process. Furthermore, subjective judgements are clearly 
paramount when it comes to the actual use of modelling outcomes. 
                                                     
 
 
2Biases in the assessment of already identified risks have received a lot more attention in the literature. 
Please refer to the Lloyd’s Emerging Risks Report “Behaviour: Bear, bull or lemming” for more background 
on this. 
 3 Expectations can hinder or facilitate the 
identification of risks 
When street planners removed all markers and traffic signs in London’s Kensington High Street, casualties 
fell 43%.iv Drivers could no longer rely on their established mental models, forcing them to be more prepared 
for the unexpected. Expectations usually come from established mental models, limiting our attention to the 
few aspects we decide are relevant in any given moment and often overlooking the unexpected. In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example, disaster plans were inadequate for the level of disruption 
caused by lost access and transportation, broken down communication channels, and a lack of replacement 
supplies.v 
 
A number of isolated events have caught insurers by surprise but, in general, risk experts such as analysts, 
brokers, and underwriters are better at identifying risks that are not readily apparent to non-experts.vi Experts 
tend to have more sophisticated mental models that help identify potential problems or pitfalls.vii Expertise 
does, however, not always improve risk awareness; especially in areas where losses are infrequent. 
 
One critical factor that determines whether expertise is beneficial is how much it builds on false or incomplete 
learning. Before the financial crisis many investors became heavily exposed to toxic debts only to realise the 
impact later on. Similarly, reinsurers trading different layers of exposure under the false impression of risks 
and high returns, spurred by commissions as high as 10%, triggered the London Market excess of loss spiral 
of the 1980s.viii Prompt and accurate feedback is needed to accurately identify current risks. If feedback is 
inaccurate, delayed, or diffused, then mental models can develop that hinder the identification of risks. This, 
of course, applies to new and emerging risks, which do not offer much scope for feedback. Long tail claims 
are another point in case where many years can pass between an incident and the resulting claims. 
 
Although people have the ability to learn from 
others’ experiences, the mind prefers to base 
expectations on personal experience, with 
ramifications for identifying rarely occurring 
risks.ix Consider the example of company 
liquidations. Every year since the start of the 
economic crisis over 15,000 companies in 
England and Wales have become insolvent.x 
People tend to deal with many companies on a 
regular basis, leading to their false assumption 
that all companies are financially viable. The 
internet provides another example: users are 
typically unaware of the constant level of threat 
posed by cyber-attacks. The tendency to 
overlook rare events based on personal 
experience is particularly relevant for re/insurers. 
Arguably, risk experts’ increased exposure to, 
and experience of, risks may numb their 
sensitivity to infrequent losses. Loss models in 
the insurance industry are not immune to this. 
For example, catastrophe models do not 
explicitly consider the loss potential from 
tsunamis, which accounted for a significant 
portion of cedant losses following the March 
2011 Tohoku earthquake.xi 
 
The impact of expectations can also be observed to some extent in the insurance cycle where demands for 
insurance cover surge and premiums can rise after a loss, while policy renewals drop and markets can 
soften as losses move further into the past. People generally live in temporal bubbles where current and 
recent events have the strongest bearing on expectations of how the future will unfold, also known as 
exploration bias. It is often seen in financial markets where investors have too high expectations after bull 
markets, but too little confidence after bear markets.xii The London Market excess of loss spiral of the 1980s 
provides another illustration of the exploration bias. The crisis was preceded by a long period of growth and 
low frequency of major catastrophes. 
 
Box 1: Features of Incubating Disasters (adopted 
from Turner, 1976) 
 
Industrial accidents are often unexpected and catch 
people by surprise. Analyses of disasters have 
identified a number of facilitating conditions or ‘trigger’ 
events, which should ring alarm bells among risk 
analysts: 
1. Collective blindness: Organisations prone to 
disasters are characterised by rigid perceptions 
and beliefs. 
2. Distraction: A tendency to avoid ill-defined 
problems.  
3. Exclusivity: There is limited external intervention 
and complaints from outside the organisation are 
dismissed.  
4. Transparency: The information provided is 
ambiguous, wrong or misleading. 
5. Expertise: There is a lack of trained and skilled 
personnel. 
6. Compliance: Poor adherence to regulations and/or 
safety standards. 
7. Scale: Magnitude or dangers are underestimated. 
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While personal experience may be the primary factor in shaping people’s approach to risk, expectations can 
of course also be shaped by second hand accounts, such as through the media. These secondary sources, 
however, may overemphasise rare, sensational events. A corollary of this biased representation of low 
frequency events – an example being terrorist attacks - is that those potential losses are overestimated while 
more frequent events are underestimated.xiii So people’s risk perceptions can vary significantly depending on 
whether their expectations are based on their own experience, or on secondary sources.  
 
Below we highlight three areas in which expectations may affect re/insurers risk perceptions: 
 
Dependencies. Events can unfold in 
unexpected ways. For example, chain-like 
processes or correlations are often difficult 
to anticipate. While large portfolios can 
protect insurers from major losses if risks 
are independent, if risks are dependent, 
then a single incident can cause large 
losses. One challenge for re/insurers is to 
try to understand the system relationships of 
the various risks that they face (see Box 
2).xiv The more complex these relationships, 
the more likely it is that low probability 
events can have a large impact.xv 
 
Risk models. Mathematical models 
informed by science and engineering are 
increasingly used to inform core business 
decisions. Yet as Hemant Shah, CEO of 
Risk Management Solutions (RMS) noted: 
“While models can help optimise a book of 
business, an overreliance on models can 
lead to fragile portfolios that are prone to 
surprises, whether from Mother Nature or 
from the models themselves.”xvi Risk models 
create expectations of how the future will 
unfold, and when those expectations are not 
met this can come as a costly surprise. For example, some of the losses from natural disasters in 2011 were 
well beyond what any models were predicting. The challenge for re/insurers is not to rely solely on risk 
models and to use them as a guide to decision-making. Re/insurers should be mindful of the uncertainties 
inherent in predicting rare events. 
 
Social amplification. The public response to disasters is often hard to predict. xviiixvii When researchers ,xix 
analysed US transport patterns before and after 9/11, they found that the attack led to an increase in road 
traffic, with the largest increase observed on interstate highways (5.3%). Americans had substituted 
airplanes for cars – actually a riskier mode of travel. Extrapolating from road accident statistics between 1996 
to March 2003, researchers demonstrated that in order to avoid the risk of a terrorist attack a further 1,500 
people died on American roads in the aftermath of 9/11. This spike in road accidents illustrates how risks can 
be amplified by the way people respond to disasters.xxAmplification can be difficult to predict for re/insurers. 
For example, when the same analysis was carried out following the Madrid train bombings in 2004, there 
was no indication of amplification. Some Spaniards avoided train transport, but only for a very short period of 
time. There was no increase in highway traffic and consequently no increase in road fatalities.xxi Social, 
cultural, and historical differences may explain why Spaniards responded differently to the attack.3 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
3 Spain has a long history of terrorist attacks on Spanish soil. Unlike Americans, Spaniards relied on the 
mode of transport used in the attack (i.e. trains) to attend anti-terrorism demonstrations following the event.  
Box 2: Expecting the Unexpected: Related Risks 
 
Interrelated risks are complex to understand and often 
unexpected and make risk modelling a particular 
challenge, especially in light of the new Solvency II 
regulations. Risks can be conditional, such as the loss of a 
vessel and the loss of its cargo, or correlated due to some 
variable causing different types of losses. For example El 
Niño can lead to floods in California, declined fish stock in 
parts of Southern America, and greater dryness in 
Australia, which increases the likelihood of wildfires xiv. Tail 
dependency describes a scenario where high damages 
occur together. For example, property insurance claims 
and car insurance claims are normally independent. 
However, when a natural disasters strikes then both are 
likely to suffer damages, creating a dependency in the 
‘tails’ (i.e., the low probability, high loss end of the 
distribution) xiv. In their analysis of insurance company 
failure, Ashby, Sharma and McDonnell describe how risks 
are related in ways re/insurers did not anticipate xxvii. One 
example is investments heavily exposed to economic 
downturns such as commercial properties, causing 
re/insurers’ assets to shrink while at the same time insured 
losses increased. A similar squeeze was felt by re/insures 
who invested in other insurers in similar markets, causing 
      
  
 
 
TIPS: Below we highlight some questions that re/insurers can ask to counteract some of the issues 
that arise from the way expectations affect risk perceptions. 
 
Habitual thinking Do established routines miss out on important pieces of information? Do processes 
lead to habits that prevent people from asking important questions? Have the 
parameters changed? Do routines no longer cover all angles? 
 
Missing feedback Is there enough information to verify your assumptions? How robust are your 
models? What kind of information would make them more robust? Can you use 
auxiliary variables as substitutes for missing information? How does your company 
feed information back to you? How timely and relevant is the feedback? 
 
Desensitization Have some risks lost their bite? Have some of your colleagues become so familiar 
with certain risks that they have been caught out? Could you be in the same situation 
one day? If so, how can you prevent that from happening? 
 
Exploration bias Are some events forgotten? Is everyone talking about the same thing, with recent or 
current events consuming all the attention? If you could go back or forwards a few 
months in time – how would that affect how much attention you devote to different 
risks?  
 
Media  The media is selective. Does the media influence your underwriting decisions? Media 
coverage can bias risk assessments. Is there relevant information that has not 
received media attention? How does the public respond to the media coverage? Are 
there any risks associated with the public’s response? What if you are underwriting a 
risk that suddenly receives a lot of media attention? Could this increase the number 
of claims and exacerbate the losses? 
 
Amplification Some disasters can cause costly shockwaves. Do your models account for the way 
people may respond to a disaster or accident? People’s actions can create 
dependencies between seemingly unrelated risks. Is it possible, or indeed 
worthwhile, to account for those?  
 
Risk dependencies Dependencies can make some risks unaffordable. Do you have guidelines whether 
or not your premiums should account for dependencies? Do you know how 
dependencies affect your Solvency Capital Requirement? Is it possible that a line of 
business is lucrative considered alone, but not in your portfolio? 
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4 Risk perception is context dependent 
We are constantly exposed to countless risks, such as pollution, traffic and flu, yet we do not attend to all 
hazards and instead choose, consciously or unconsciously, to focus on some and ignore others. This is 
because individuals and companies alike have limited resources and cannot attend to all risks 
simultaneously. How risk is prioritised is influenced by social and cultural contexts, with scientific evidence 
often playing a secondary role.
xxiii
xxii In the US, concerns arose about silicone implants in the 1990s, which led 
to the largest class-action settlement in history.  Soon attention turned away from the implants to the 
“Millennium Bug”, which consumed an estimated US$450bn in protective measuresxxiv.  
 
Culturally transmitted risk priorities have consequences for insurers. After the first significant terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Centre in 1993, insurers did not amend their insurance policies to exclude terrorism from 
unnamed perils.xxv This was before the ‘war on terror’ made the headlines. After 9/11 the industry had to 
shoulder US$35bn in claims as their coverage against unnamed perils still included terrorist attacks. Against 
the backdrop of the current geopolitical context, the decision not to amend policies after the first attacks 
might seem short-sighted. In the cultural and historic context of the 1990s, it probably reflected a perfectly 
reasonable response.  
 
There are universal aspects of contexts that draw people’s attention to and away from risks. For example, 
people are more sensitive to potential hazards in novel or uncertain situations and when the outcome is 
beyond their control (eg an avian flu pandemic), while risks that occur in more familiar contexts can be 
overlooked more easily (eg accidents in the home and garden). One implication for re/insurers is that, 
counter intuitively, rare or novel perils may be overlooked for lines of business that are underwritten 
frequently. 
 
Re/insurers are exposed to risks that arise from a variety of contexts (eg technology risks; underwriting risks; 
investment risks; etc.). A recent survey
xxvii
xxvi conducted with chief executive officers and managing directors of 
London insurers found that re/insurers can be accustomed to focus on some risk segments more than 
others. In particular, underwriting and investment risks tend to receive greater attention in insurers’ own risk 
assessment than operational risks. It would be a mistake to dismiss this imbalance as a mere reflection of 
actual business needs; operational 
weaknesses can play an important role 
in insurance company failures.  
 
The tendency to favour some risk areas 
over others can come from the desire to 
focus on contexts where risks can be 
quantified, and thus benchmarks 
established, with greater ease. This 
tendency is by no means specific to 
re/insurers. People are inclined to focus 
attention on things they can grasp 
easily, and tend to avoid things that are 
more difficult to understand, even if they 
are important.xxviii
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
,xxix,xxx A simple 
example is illustrated in Figure 1. People 
are willing to pay more for an overfilled 
ice cream serving than for an underfilled 
serving, although the latter contains 
more ice cream overall.xxxi That’s 
because it is easier to focus on the 
relative filling than the total amount of 
ice cream, which is harder to judge. In the same way, people also tend to favour well-structured problems 
and shun away from more difficult ones; a recognised problem in risk management.  Financial products 
offer another example. Be it subprime mortgage-backed securities, or excess of loss contracts of the 1980s; 
problems inevitably arise when executives deal with financial products that involve aspects they do not 
thoroughly understand.  The tendency to focus on features that are easy to evaluate increases when 
people have to justify their decisions to others.  Holding people accountable for their decisions is therefore 
unlikely to eradicate this type of bias. 
 
Figure 1: A larger (left) and smaller (right) ice cream 
serving adopted from Hsee (1998).People are inclined to 
focus on one attribute (relative filling) and ignore others 
that are more difficult to judge (absolute filling). 
 
 
 The context can bring concepts to 
mind that influence the way people 
deal with risks. For example, in 
laboratory experiments conducted 
with students merely thinking about 
the words “enterprising”, “daring” or 
“adventurous” made people more 
likely to take riskier bets, buy a car 
without a guarantee, or endorse 
riskier management strategies.
xxxvi
xxxv 
Subsequent research  produced 
similar results with investment 
advisors in large commercial banks 
and accountants in Certified Public 
Accountant (CPA) firms. Investors 
were asked to read a story about 
someone taking a gamble and 
winning money in a casino. Reading 
this story made them take more risks 
in subsequent – unrelated - 
investment decisions. What is more, 
the financial experts were more 
biased than a group of students who 
performed the same tasks. Subtle 
hints that bold moves pay off can 
thus spur people’s risk appetite; 
perhaps even more so with experienced market players than others. This provides both a challenge and an 
opportunity for re/insurers as the way risks and returns are communicated in the market likely affects 
underwriting outcomes. 
 
Goals explain why people may be willing to take risks to achieve a larger return. Goals can shift the standard 
of what constitutes a good outcome. When the bar is raised, anything that falls short of the target is 
unsatisfactory and can be perceived as a ‘loss’. This explains why people can be willing to forgo smaller 
gains in the pursuit of a larger, albeit riskier, outcome.xxxvii
xxxviii
 Indeed, research has shown that ambitious goals 
make people more prone to take risks; more so than the goal to do well.  Markets that nourish ambition 
and offer (short-term) rewards for risky behaviour are bound to trigger greater risk taking among market 
players. This conclusion may be unsurprising, but our analysis suggests that managing risks needs to go 
beyond setting company objectives to managing the goals and ambitions of individual market actors. 
 
Goals not only affect how people appraise gains or losses, but also their belief about the likelihood of 
positive and negative outcomes. Generally speaking, people overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes 
and underestimate that of negative outcomes.xxxix These optimistic biases are particularly strong when 
people predict the outcome of their own actionsxl or when they believe they are in charge.xli 
 
The face to face nature of interactions in the London Market can also affect the identification and appraisal of 
risks. One example is the subscription market where brokers make presentations to the underwriters on the 
market floor. Initial submissions guide the underwriters’ interpretation of what the offer entails and the risk 
involved. To illustrate with an example from the legal context: in one study researchers asked professional 
judges to evaluate a case of sexual harassment.xlii The prosecution requested either short (two months) or 
long (34 months) sentences. The judges’ sentencing decisions differed by a staggering ten months (18 
months and 28 months, respectively) depending on whether they had received a low or a high request. The 
discrepancy arose because the prosecution’s request gave judges clues about the crime and guided their 
sentencing decisions. In the same vein, brokers’ presentations are likely to play a role in guiding 
underwriters’ risks appraisals. 
 
The market offers ample opportunity to turn to others for guidance. This is not in itself a bad thing and can 
make decision-making more efficient, as seeking other people’s opinion takes less time and effort than 
gathering and analysing information individually. Seeking guidance from, and relying on the perceptions of a 
few ‘experts’ or aligning views with commonly held beliefs can, however, also increase the chance that some 
risks are overlooked. Time pressure and information overload can increase this tendency. 
 
Research conducted by Solomon Aschxliii provides a powerful demonstration of how much influence the 
social context can really have. Asch asked participants sitting in small groups to compare the length of lines. 
Figure 2: Comparison of line lengths showing the power of 
the social context.  
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In particular, the participants had to indicate which one of several lines was of equal length to a reference 
line (see Figure 2).The answer was obvious: one line was clearly the same, and the other lines were clearly 
different. However, to the surprise of one person - the only person in the room who was not an actor playing 
the role of a participant – everyone else endorsed an incorrect answer, opting for one of the dissimilar lines. 
Faced with the pressure of the group, the vast majority of participants also chose the incorrect answer. Later 
research showed that people are especially inclined to follow the opinion of people they share a relationship 
with.xliv 
 
The power of the social context is particularly strong when people’s actions are public, when decision makers 
are under time pressure, and when there is uncertainty or ambiguity surrounding the decisions. Underwriting 
risks meet all these criteria. For example, the practice of signing a slip could exacerbate the tendency to 
follow other people’s lead, especially when the lead underwriter is more senior and/or someone particularly 
trusted.xlv The lines signed by colleagues can also guide underwriters as to the likely risks involved. In more 
extreme cases, underwriters could even be inclined to ignore evidence that goes against the decisions of 
their fellow colleagues. In some cases this so called ‘herding’ behaviour could draw attention away from 
potential risks.  
 
Financial markets are also social structures and good relationships and trust have intrinsic value. When 
judging risks individuals may be reluctant to question the judgment of colleagues.
xlvii
xlvi In some contexts this 
trade-off can be beneficial, in other contexts it may backfire. On 23 March 1994 an airplane captain gave his 
son the permission to sit at the controls of a Russian International Airline A310-304.  The child turned the 
control wheel during autopilot mode, which set off a chain of events and eventually led to the crash of the 
airplane killing all 75 passengers on board. The attending co-pilot trusted the captain’s judgment that nothing 
would happen as a result. When dealing with risks underwriters need to weigh up the pros and cons of 
relying on someone else’s judgment. 
 
We have highlighted ways through which being part of a group can amplify risks. It is important to emphasise 
that there are many benefits of being in a group too. Group members monitor one another and can intervene 
when individuals breach norms or engage in behaviours that go against the groups’ identity or core 
values.xlviii,xlix The London Market provides an important platform for this kind of system of checks and 
balances; a unique advantage of the close interactions afforded by the environment.4 For example, if a lead 
underwriter accepts a risk which others view as bad, they may choose not to follow and therefore the risk is 
less likely to get underwritten. There are also formal procedures to monitor underwriting at most insurers, 
such as internal and external reviews, or Lloyd’s performance management function within the Lloyd’s 
market. 
 
 
TIPS: Below we highlight some questions that re/insurers can ask to make risk perceptions less 
dependent on the context.  
 
Decision context Would you take the same decisions in the presence of other people? What about a 
different context? How does your workplace impact the decisions you make? Does it 
affect your risk attitudes? What about your colleagues?  
 
Prioritising easy 
attributes 
Are risk assessments too focused on attributes that can be assessed easily? What 
about attributes that are more difficult to judge? Could you or your colleagues be 
overlooking something important? Do you assess risks in the contexts of smaller or 
larger risks? How relevant are those comparisons? 
 
Sampling What motivates you to analyse a problem from a particular angle (eg impact on 
environment; economic impact)? Are your estimates based on a subset of 
information? Does the selection bias the outcome, and if so in which direction? 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
4 See Paula Jarzabkowski, Michael Smets, and Paul Spee's report "Trading risk: The value of relationships, 
models and face-to-face interaction in a global reinsurance market" (2010), for an analysis of the Lloyd’s and 
Bermuda subscription markets with an emphasis on the comparison between face-to-face interactions and 
electronic trading. 
  
Goals 
 
People with differing goals or interests can come to different conclusions based on 
the same piece of evidence. Do your colleagues’ goals differ from yours? How does 
this affect your underwriting? What goals do people in different roles or functions in 
your organisation have? What information are they likely to focus on? Is there 
something they might be missing out?  
 
Shifting standards Ambitious goals can make people take risks. How realistic are the goals your firm is 
setting? Do you think unrealistic goals make people more willing to take risks and be 
less selective in their underwriting practices?  
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5 The effects of power 
Consider rolling a dice. If you can predict the outcome you get £10, otherwise you get nothing. Would you 
rather roll the dice yourself or have someone else roll the dice for you? People in power are more inclined to 
roll the dice themselves. In fact, when researchers gave people this choice, those in power always chose to 
roll the dice (100%), but participants in a comparison group did not (69%).l This discrepancy arises from the 
fact that power increases people’s perceptions of control, even beyond one’s reach. After all, in a game of 
chance one cannot control the outcome. 
 
Power refers to the capacity to alter another person’s condition or state of mind by providing or withholding 
resources or administering punishment.  Power is more than organisational rank and is integral to every 
social interaction. Power can derive from the level of seniority as more junior staff members are often 
expected to follow the instructions of senior employees. More generally, the less individuals are constrained 
in their decisions the greater their power. People in power tend to have high status and are more likely to 
enjoy respect and admiration in organisations, although this need not always be the case.  
 
Power can turn the focus away from potential losses. Power holders feel less vulnerable and are more 
inclined to take risks, provided that doing so allows them to gain something of value. li For example, in the 
energy industry the number of CEO stock options correlates with the extent to which oil and gas companies 
engage in risky projects.lii CEO compensation also tends to be higher in firms that take more risks, as 
indicated by greater stock return volatility.liii In the re/insurance context, research has shown that there is 
more variation in the stock prices of larger insurance companies than with smaller companies, which could 
be interpreted as a sign for greater risk taking, allowing for other factors that could influence stock prices.liv 
 
The greater risk appetite of powerful individuals can stem from a  tendency to focus more on rewards and 
successes, while people who are lacking power are often more cautious and attentive to threats and 
potential obstacles.lv Power tends to increase optimism although this is probably a consequence, not a 
cause, of a diminished sensitivity to risks. Figure 3 provides an illustration of how power affects people’s 
judgments of losses. When asked to estimate the number of fatalities across a range of hazards, people who 
felt powerful gave considerably lower estimates on average than people who felt powerless.  Other research 
has shown that people in power are more inclined to set overly ambitious goals,lvi which as discussed earlier 
can exacerbate risk taking. 
 
Power can also reduce the inclination to take multiple perspectives into account and can render decision 
processes more one-sided. For example, studies of US Supreme Court decisions have shown that powerful 
justices engage in less complex reasoning processes than less powerful justices, who tend to weigh up the 
pros and cons of various options more.
lviii
lvii Power can also increase people’s preference for information that is 
consistent with their positions and views.  This tendency can hamper risk identification considering that 
other people are often reluctant to argue against the decisions of power holders. Biased decision-making of 
leaders, and blind followership have been linked to well-known disasters such as the Bay of Pigs invasion.lix,5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
5 The Bay of Pigs invasion was a disastrous attempt to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro planned by J F 
Kennedy and his advisors. There were numerous failures in the planning such as the invasion force landing 
in inappropriate terrain and the overestimation of the support amongst Islanders for the invasion. 
 In the underwriting context more junior underwriters may follow the lead and may be less likely to question 
the assumptions that underlie a certain underwriting decision if a senior underwriter is the first to sign the 
slip. More junior underwriters may also be reluctant to engage in actions that deviate notably from others as 
doing so attracts attention and exposes them to the risk of embarrassment if something goes wrong. 
Underwriters may also feel under pressure to accept the requests of brokers who control access to ceding 
insurers. Depending on the lines of business involved, this can place brokers in a powerful position.  
 
It is important to note that power does not always increase myopia and risk-taking. If the situation calls for 
prudence and perhaps even risk-aversion, then one would not expect power holders to exhibit much risk 
appetite. Examples of such situations in the re/insurance context could be hard markets following a 
catastrophe or large market loss, or firms running low on capital reserves. New capital requirements are also 
likely to turn the focus to benchmarks such as solvency at risk, at least in the short run. Lastly, research has 
shown that power holders are also reluctant to take risks when they are aware that doing so risks them 
losing their privileges.lx 
 
Earlier we have argued that managing risks requires firms to consider the goals and ambitions of individual 
market actors. The above analysis suggests that this need is strongest for key decision markers within the 
insurance value chain. This conclusion echoes the earlier analysis of insurance company failures, which has 
highlighted the importance of management practices as a determinant of insurers’ success and failure.xxvii 
 
 
TIPS: The following questions can help re/insurers raise awareness of potential biases that are 
linked to power.  
 
Confidence Power increases the sense that one can control things, even random events. This 
goes hand in hand with a stronger belief that things will turn out in one’s favour. 
Have you come across a situation like that? Does over-confidence have a negative 
impact on the risk-management in your firm? Can subordinates voice their 
opinions? 
Conformity Do you experience a pressure to conform? What about your colleagues, do you 
expect them to go along? Do you think the others have different risk-attitudes than 
yourself? Would your colleagues say the same? Are there ways to improve current 
practices? 
  
Figure 3: Estimated number of fatalities across 17 potential causes of death (eg tornados, lung 
cancer, airplane accident). Participants made the estimates after having experienced high or low 
power. From Anderson and Galinsky (2006). 
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6 Putting risks into perspective 
Adopting the right perspective can turn the focus on or away from risks. In this section we examine three 
aspects that are of relevance to risk professionals. 
 
Planners often adopt what the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman termed an ‘inside’ perspective.lxi He 
observed that planners tend to focus on the specifics of a problem or event, and do not consider the 
distribution of similar events that have taken place in the past. Because things rarely turn out how we would 
want them to be, people are motivated to see the future as being distinct from the past, or ‘unique’. Yet, 
generally speaking, the best predictor for the future is the past. Failure to adopt an “outside” perspective that 
takes into account similar past events can lead to overconfidence and augment errors in forecasts.lxii 
 
People adopt an ‘inside’ perspective when they have stakes in a particular scenario and this affects their 
estimates of success or failure as potential pitfalls can be trivialised or ignored (eg what are the chances that 
the deep sea oil drilling platform will be operational in X amount of time?). In the absence of vested interests, 
people are more inclined to adopt an ‘outside perspective’. Because this implies attending to frequencies and 
distributional information (eg how many similar oil drilling platforms have been constructed in X amount of 
time?), risk estimates often become more conservative.  
 
While planners have an interest in the smooth delivery of their projects, re/insurers have an interest in the 
ability of risk models to make predictions about future events that are sufficiently accurate to guide their 
business decisions. To the extent that modelling risks is considered too much in isolation (an ‘inside’ view), 
without an appreciation of the ability of models to predict insured events in the past (an ‘outside’ view), 
re/insurers can fall prey to Kahneman’s fallacy describe above. Re/insurers should therefore consider the 
past performance of risk models to make a realistic assessment of their ability to predict the future (i.e. their 
modelling risk).lxiii 
 
Although considering events in too much isolation can lead to biased judgments, re/insurers also need to 
stay alert to key differences between similar lines of business. For example deep sea oil drilling in the Gulf of 
Mexico may pose a unique set of challenges when compared to deep sea oil drilling off the coast of India. 
Underwriting risks requires a high level of technical expertise and an appreciation of both key similarities and 
differences between programmes.  
 
Time perspective is another crucial aspect. Because people are oriented towards the here and now, a long-
term perspective can benefit the identification of more distant risks. Temporal discounting describes a 
phenomenon whereby outcomes decrease in value as they move into the more distant future, and increase 
in value as they move closer in time.
lxvii
lxiv Compare a 5% saving in operational costs in the next fiscal period 
against a 5% saving that will materialise in ten years’ time. The fact that closer events or outcomes receive 
greater weight than distant ones can be problematic if benefits and costs are associated with different 
delays. The temporal presence of more immediate gains can reduce foresight and draw attention away from 
long-term risks.lxv Natural hazards provide a good example.lxvi As developers prioritise immediate gains, the 
potential for losses grows larger. For example, the popularity of coastal areas in the US has led to a 
significant concentration of insured value in areas that are highly exposed to natural disasters.  
 Time is a crucial factor if one wants to determine the consequences of an event. And yet re/insurers often 
tend to ignore time in their risk assessments.lxviii A striking example of the importance of time in risk 
assessments is the introduction of Superfund. Superfund is the common name for the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) passed by US Congress in 1980 in 
response to the threat of hazardous waste sites. Superfund exposed insurance companies retrospectively to 
billions in environmental and asbestos losses. Some estimates of the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste 
sites exceed US$1 trillion. The Superfund programme assigned potentially responsible parties retroactive, 
strict, and joint and several liability.lxix Insurers continue to be exposed to environmental and asbestos 
liabilities, often through older policies purchased before 1986. UK insurers are also affected by asbestos-
related claims, many of which are linked to mesothelioma6. According to recent estimates, the UK insurance 
industry is facing £11bn losses related to asbestos in the period 2009 to 2050.lxx 
 
                                                     
 
 
6Mesothelioma is a cancer that affects the tissue that lines lungs, stomach, heart and other organs. Many 
people who develop the cancer have been exposed to asbestos particles. It can take several decades 
between exposure and the development of the disease. 
Figure 4: A figure consisting of global (R) and local elements (As). Perception shifts between the 
two planes. From a distance the global element is more salient; in proximity the local elements lie 
at the focus of attention. 
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Time is not the only critical element when considering risks. Events or objects can also be thought of in terms 
of concrete or abstract attributes. An abstract mental image is focused on global, overarching themes and 
looks at the “big picture”. lxxi For example, a flood in London could be thought of abstractly as a “natural 
disaster”. Concrete mental images on the other hand focus on local details and incidental features. Thinking 
concretely implies segmenting events or objects into many, smaller categories. Therefore, a concrete 
representation of a flood in London could entail, for example, the flash flooding of the London Underground; 
Whitehall, Houses of Parliament and City Hall under water, etc. 
 
Distance increases people’s focus on abstract features. Conversely, proximity increases people’s focus on 
concrete features.lxxii
lxxiii
lxxiv
 Distance can arise from a temporal dimension (now vs. then), from space (near vs. far), 
agency (me vs. them), or from realism (real vs. hypothetical).  The implication is that distant events or objects 
are normally perceived in more abstract terms than more proximate events or objects. If you live in London, 
for example, compare a flood in Papua New Guinea with a Thames flood in London. A disaster closer to 
home elicits much more concrete mental images. This has implications for risk perception because concrete 
scenarios highlight potential hazards or obstacles that may not be evident when an event is thought of more 
abstractly.  People are often more confident about events or activities in the distance, but as the events 
move closer they come to realise the potential drawbacks or obstacles. Sometimes events or activities that 
were once desirable are no longer appealing when they are viewed from a closer perspective.  Risk 
prevention is a good example. Future investments to prevent losses from potential hazards are often 
considered worthwhile and desirable, but once the time has come to undertake the investments, the efforts 
seem too vast and the expenditures too great.lxxv 
 
 
Concrete perils are much more visceral and attention-grabbing than abstract ones.  Table 1 shows the 
results of studies that asked people how much money they would be willing to pay for different types of 
insurance coverage.lxxvi lxxvii,  As can be seen, people were willing to pay more for concrete, mutually exclusive 
perils, than for more abstract, all-encompassing ones. In fact, the combined prices for policies covering 
specific, mutual exclusive losses were much higher than the prices for policies that covered any loss. The 
studies looked at health and travel insurances. Insurers are of course much more knowledgeable in those 
domains where policies can be priced firmly on the basis of historic data. Other programmes, especially 
those that involve rare or novel risks, do not lend themselves to the same approach. It is in these contexts 
where abstract perceptions carry the risk that some specific perils are overlooked.    
 
Table 1: Willingness to pay for abstract and concrete causes of losses. Based on Eisner and Strotz 
(1961), and Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther (1993) 
 
 
 
Policy Cover Amount Willing to Pay for Policy 
Hospitalization  
Any disease  $89.10 
Any accident  $69.55 
Any reason $41.53 
Flight insurance  
Any act of terrorism $14.12 
Any non-terrorism related mechanical failure $10.31 
Any reason $12.03  
 
  
 
 
 
TIPS: The following questions can help underwriters to put risks into perspective. 
 
Inside perspective Do people overestimate the uniqueness of current projects or events? Can you think 
of processes that would benefit from bearing in mind how similar activities turned out 
in the past?   
 
Discounting People can expose themselves to risks because immediate gains carry greater 
weight than distant losses. Does that also apply to the risks you are underwriting? 
Are your models based on the assumption that people weigh near and distant losses 
equally? Do your risk management strategies emphasise short term gains? 
 
Abstract and 
concrete thinking 
Risks that elicit concrete mental images seem more paramount than risks that are 
more diffuse and abstract. Can you break down diffuse risks into smaller categories 
(e.g. distinct classes of events)? Ask ‘how’ questions about future events.    
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3: The role of the organisation 
 
Several years ago sociologists coined the term high reliability organisations to describe organisations that 
operate in fields where failure can have dramatic consequences, and yet losses are extremely rare.lxxviii
lxxix
lxxxi lxxxii
lxxxiii
 
Resilience is a more contemporary buzz word that describes a related concept. Examples studied in the 
literature include aircraft carriers or traffic control systems.  High reliability organisations are characterised 
by collective mindfulness, which describes a heightened sense of vigilance and focused awareness. lxxx  
Mindfulness reduces overconfidence, fosters greater risk awareness, and reduces risk appetite. ,  
Resilience also derives from a culture that emphasises analytical thinking and discourages simple 
interpretations. Such a “licence to think” goes along with an organisational attitude that embraces diversity 
and enables low ranking individuals to step in and take charge.  For example, crew members on a nuclear 
powered aircraft carrier’s deck can prevent aircrafts from departing or landing without a superior being able 
to overrule their decision.  At the same time, there are also several layers of redundancy to buffer against 
personnel failures in these systems.  
 
Organisations can shape processes and work environments in ways to maximise risk awareness. For 
example, thinking outside the box can be fostered by exposing employees to different cultures and work 
environments.lxxxiv  Reliance on routines can be thwarted by giving people time to make decisions; and 
feedback about the impact of different courses of action can encourage a consideration of multiple 
alternatives. Finally, organisations can promote the following principles, amongst others, to assist staff 
engaged in key risk decisions:  
 
> Challenge assumptions  
 
> Consult others with divergent views 
 
> Adopt different viewpoint to change the frame of the decision 
 
> Elicit and compare people’s understanding of an issue 
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7 Challenges and concluding recommendations 
One challenge is that signs of hazards are sometimes hard to interpret. In 1983, a new Russian satellite 
system detected a missile attack and triggered an alarm. A judgment call by a military commander prevented 
an escalation. In reality, no attack had been launched. The sophisticated warning system was triggered by a 
reflection of light from a satellite.lxxxv 
 
Unlike the Russian commander, re/insurers can tackle a looming risk with an ‘expect the worst’ attitude. This 
will make it less likely that a hazard slips through, but it will also increase the rate of false alarms. On the 
other hand re/insurers can be reluctant to accept more tentative evidence for a hazard, knowing that the 
premium will be very high or unaffordable, or because regulations restrict the information that can be 
considered when pricing policies. In some cases, exploring risk characteristics could be deemed impossible 
or impractical due to the cost, time, or effort involved. Finally, underwriters may simply not want to come 
across as ‘paranoid’. All these concerns would reduce the number of false alarms, but also increase the 
likelihood that some risks are overlooked. The important point to remember when interpreting signs of 
potential hazards is that both risk-avoidant and risk-seeking attitudes are prone to error and lead to an 
increase in false alarms or misses (see Table 2). Neither attitude helps discern threats where the evidence is 
uncertain. Uncertainty can be reduced by gathering more or better evidence, or by finding ways to make 
better use of information that is already at hand.  
Table 2: Possible outcomes in the classification of potential hazards 
 
  Decision 
  Hazards Absent Hazard Present 
True State of Nature 
(unknown) 
Hazard Absent Correct Rejection False Alarm (Error I) 
Hazard Present Miss (Error II) Hit 
 
 
A second challenge for re/insurers is the pace and magnitude of new developments in business and society. 
The commercial use of the internet only began in the 1990s; it now provides a medium for threats and 
attacks on an unprecedented scale. With the increasing pace of technological development it is conceivable 
that the developments we will see in the next twenty years will be similar to the developments we have seen 
in the past one hundred years.Ixiii There is a need to scan new or emerging risks on a regular basis. This is a 
challenge because re/insurers do not have unlimited resources. One way to address this problem is by 
focusing on risk horizons that are of strategic relevance to organisations. Table 3 illustrates how strategic 
priorities and the pace of new developments can be combined into a matrix that specifies different timescales 
for scanning risks. It is important to note that strategic priorities are not static and can shift over time, which 
means they also require on-going re-assessment.  
 
Acknowledging that biases exist and may affect business outcomes is a third and final challenge. When 
dealing with risks, in particular those linked to rare or novel events, people have to face uncertainty. Because 
uncertainty is unsettling, people tend to rationalise their decisions. For example, underwriters can point to 
risk models or analysts to justify their business decisions. Rationalising provides a sense of security, but it 
also carries the risk that potential biases are downplayed or ignored. People prefer to believe that their 
decisions are sound and objective, and if biases occur they affect others but not themselves. Yet wherever 
human judgments occur, there is room for selection (focusing more on some aspects than others) and 
subjectivity (bringing information in line with one’s beliefs).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Timescales for reviews of new and emerging risks 
Strategic Relevance
Pa
ce
 o
f D
ev
el
op
m
en
ts
low high
sl
ow
fa
st
Regular reviews
Frequent reviews
Infrequent reviews
Occasional reviews
 
 
 
Acknowledging behavioural risks is also the first step towards using behavioural principles to create added 
value. The following recommendations highlight how re/insurers, who are accustomed to working with 
experts at the forefront of technology and engineering, can embrace behavioural principles: 
 
 Encourage discussions between behavioural scientists and the industry. This report provides a 
starting point for communication between the industry and the scientific community. Further dialogue 
through organisations such as the Lighthill Risk Network7 should be encouraged.   
 Support research initiatives. Scientists require the support of industry to apply their knowledge and 
expertise to situations that are most relevant for organisations. There is a need for more behavioural 
research in work settings. 
 Involve the social sciences and humanities. Risk analysis can benefit from the expertise 
accumulated in the social sciences and humanities. For example, an understanding of social 
amplification requires an understanding of social, cultural and historical settings.  
 Encourage divergent thinking. Organisations often create pressure to conform. Insurers can 
develop platforms and environments where divergent thinking is actively encouraged. For example 
exposing employees to different roles or environments can promote different viewpoints and remove 
preconceptions.  
 Acknowledge the limitations of risk identification. Re/insurers are dealing with complex issues 
where it is impossible to identify all unknown unknowns. However, by developing robust and 
comprehensive processes and procedures that take into account human factors, these uncertainties 
could be managed more effectively. 
 Reward behaviour that contributes to better risk identification. Organisational reward structures 
may encourage short-term thinking. Loss ratios may not be a good measure to assess performance 
                                                     
 
 
7 A network formed by Aon Benfield, Catlin, Guy Carpenter and Lloyd’s designed to foster relationships 
between academia and the insurance industry and ensure future research relevant to the insurance industry. 
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in the context of new or emerging risks, or risks that are infrequent. Reward structures provide a 
means of aligning the goals of employees with company objectives.8 
 
Insurance allows companies to take risks and can therefore be seen as a vehicle for innovation and growth. 
It enables individuals and institutions to overcome uncertainties and expand into unknown and new 
territories. At the same time, trends, such as the rapid expansion of technology and engineering or 
environmental changes, mean that risk management is becoming increasingly complex. Managing new and 
emerging risks therefore requires an integrated holistic approach and, as this report has shown, behavioural 
factors are an important part of that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
8 ‘Rewards’ not only include financial incentives, but also other assets that can signal competence and status 
within an organisation. 
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